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The main statutory scheme for antitrust enforcement was laid out
over a century ago, with the passage of the Sherman Act.' Today, it
remains in virtually the same form as it did in 1890. But in the face of
a changing corporate culture, courts have been faced with interpretive
questions that most likely were beyond the purview of the statute's
creators. One of the questions raised in recent years concerns the ap-
plication of the Sherman Act to alleged conspiratorial activity be-
tween a parent corporation and its subsidiary Although it might be
conceptually difficult to think of a parent and subsidiary "conspir-
ing"-much as it would be to think of your left and right hands "con-
spiring"-it may be surprising to find that in some situations a parent
and a subsidiary can be held liable for antitrust damages when their
coordinated activity harms consumers or another competitor.
Under existing case law, the activity between a parent and any of
its wholly owned subsidiaries is clearly immune from conspiratorial
antitrust liability. This clarity ends when courts consider partially
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1 Sherman Act, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1-7 (1994).
2 Here I only discuss Sherman Act Section 1 liability. This section governs concerted activ-
ity. See 15 USC § 1 (1994) (prohibiting "contract[s] ... or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade").
See also text accompanying notes 31-35. Regardless of whether there is Section 1 liability, there
might be Section 2 liability if the behavior is egregious enough to "threaten[] actual monopoly."
Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Co, 467 US 752,767 (1984). Section 2 liability requires a
heightened showing of anticompetitive behavior and is determined without regard to whether
the behavior was concerted or unilateral. See id at 767-68 nn 13-14. See also text accompanying
notes 16-30.
3 A parent is a "corporation that has a controlling interest in another corporation," usu-
ally "through ownership of more than one-half the voting stock." Black's Law Dictionary 344
(West 7th ed 1999). Likewise, a subsidiary is a "corporation in which a parent corporation has a
controlling share." Id at 345. Although by the strict definitional views voting stock is the key fac-
tor, it is not clear that courts reserve the terms "parent" and "subsidiary" solely for these situa-
tions. Often, courts will simply talk of a parent "owning" a certain percentage of stock in the sub-
sidiary, without reference to the parent's voting control. See, for example, Rohlfing v Manor
Care, Inc, 172 FRD 330, 344 (N D 11 1997) (noting the percentages of its subsidiaries the parent
corporation "own[ed]"); Bell Atlantic Business Systems Services v Hitachi Data Systems Corp, 849
F Supp 702, 705-06 (N D Cal 1994) (discussing the parent-subsidiary relationship in terms of
"ownership"). Thus, it seems that courts use the terms "parent" and "subsidiary" rather loosely to
refer to any corporation owning a significant portion of an affiliated corporation. Because of this
loose interpretation, the Comment will also use the terms "parent" and "subsidiary" in a broad
and general sense not limited to majority interests in voting stock.
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owned subsidiaries. Some jurisdictions grant immunity to all majority
owned subsidiaries, just as they do to wholly owned subsidiaries.
Other jurisdictions only grant immunity for coordinated activities with
subsidiaries that are at least 90 percent owned. This uncertainty un-
doubtedly makes corporate officers uneasy. Under a pessimistic view,
the risk of liability might even cause a company and its partially
owned subsidiary to forego efficient and procompetitive business ac-
tivities for fear of antitrust liability. This inefficiency will be passed on
to the consumer.
Prior to 1984, a corporation ran the risk of incurring antitrust li-
ability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act6 for concerted action with
a subsidiary corporation that it wholly owned.7 In that year, the Su-
preme Court ruled that immunity from Section 1 liability should be
granted to a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary,8 but the Court did
not address whether, and to what extent, the same immunity should be
granted when the subsidiary is only partially owned.9 Lower courts
have generally held that immunity might be applicable in some of
these situations, but they have set inconsistent standards. Some courts
use a "de minimis" approach. In practice this means that two corpora-
tions have Section 1 immunity when one corporation has an owner-
ship interest in the other corporation that is very close to 100 percent."
Other courts grant immunity to partially owned subsidiaries more lib-
erally, through use of a "control approach." Under this standard, all
4 See, for example, Novatel Communications, Inc v Cellular Telephone, 1986 US Dist
LEXIS 16017, *24-26 (N D Ga) (granting summary judgment on Sherman Act Section 1 claim
because parent was "incapable" of conspiring with its 51 percent owned subsidiary).
5 See, for example, Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc v Jeld-Wen, Inc, 677 F Supp 1477, 1486
(D Or 1977) (extending immunity only to corporations which are a de minimis amount less than
100 percent owned by parent). See also note 10.
6 15 USC § 1.
7 See, for example, Kiefer-Stewart Co v Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc, 340 US 211, 215
(1951) (holding that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a liquor distiller were guilty under Section
1 of the Sherman Act for jointly refusing to supply a wholesaler who declined to abide by a
maximum resale pricing scheme).
8 See Copperweld, 467 US at 777 ("Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary ... are
incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act."). Copperweld is
discussed in further detail in Part I.B.
9 Copperweld, 467 US at 767 ("We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a
parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.").
10 See Aspen Title, 677 F Supp at 1482-83, 1486 (extending Section 1 immunity to a parent
corporation that held a 97.5 percent interest in a subsidiary, and denying immunity to other sub-
sidiaries in which it owned 60 percent and 75 percent). It is important to note that there is no
clear line at which an ownership of less than 100 percent ceases to qualify as de minimis. At least
one court has held that an ownership percentage as low as 91.9 percent qualifies for immunity
under the de minimis standard. See Leaco Enterprises, Inc v General Electric Co, 737 F Supp 605,
609 (D Or 1990) (holding that General Electric's 91.9 percent share in its subsidiary was a de
minimis amount less than 100 percent). While Aspen Title suggests that percentages less than or
equal to 75 percent are insufficient to qualify for immunity under the de minimis approach, there
is relatively little case law dealing with ownership interests between 75 and 90 percent.
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that is required is the parent corporation's ability to legally control the
subsidiary." Legal control has been found when the parent owns more
than 50 percent of the subsidiary." Since these differing approaches
may result in strikingly different outcomes in factually identical situa-
tions, corporate defendants cannot accurately determine their poten-
tial liability until they are actually brought into court. This result hin-
ders defendants from being able to limit their liability ex ante. It also
results in similarly situated defendants being treated differently across
different jurisdictions, thereby creating the potential for forum shop-
ping." All of this uncertainty poses significant difficulty for potential
defendants in their efforts to engage in meaningful business planning."
To overcome the uncertainty in this area of law, this Comment pro-
poses that courts adopt a modified control approach for analyzing
conspiratorial liability of partially owned subsidiaries. The approach.
considers two aspects of the parent-subsidiary relationship: the per-
centage of the parent's ownership of the subsidiary's common stock,
and the percentage of the parent's ownership of the subsidiary's vot-
ing stock. The modified control approach only grants immunity when
the parent has more than 50 percent of the common stock and a le-
gally controlling interest in the voting stock."
Part I of this Comment discusses Sherman Act Section 1 liability,
with a particular focus on the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
concerted activity between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiaries.
Part II examines the unresolved controversy of liability between a
parent corporation and its partially owned subsidiary and analyzes the
various court approaches to the issue, primarily the de minimis ap-
proach and the control approach. Part III proposes that courts adopt a
modified version of the control approach.
11 See, for example, Bell Atlantic, 849 F Supp at 706 ("Copperweld found that a parent and
a wholly-owned subsidiary are [incapable of conspiring] because the parent has the power to ex-
ercise full control over its subsidiary. For the same reasons, a parent and a subsidiary over which
the parent has legal control cannot conspire to restrain trade.").
12 See, for example, Novatel Communications, 1986 US Dist LEXIS 16017 at *24-26 (grant-
ing immunity when the parent owned 51 percent of the subsidiary).
13 Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Harv L Rev 1677, 1677 (1990). The author
writes:
Forum shopping has been defined as a litigant's attempt "to have his action tried in a par-
ticular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
verdict." The American legal system tends to treat forum shopping as unethical and ineffi-
cient; parties who forum shop are accused of abusing the adversary system and squandering
judicial resources.
Id, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 590 (West 5th ed 1979).
14 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 12 (1984) (noting
that the vagueness found in such doctrines as the rule of reason hinders business planning and
increases litigation costs).
15 See Part III.A.
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1. CONCERTED ACTIvITY UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Statutory Interpretation
1. Comparing Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The prevailing view of the Sherman Act is that it was intended
"to promote some approximation to the economist's idea of competi-
tion, viewed as a means toward the end of maximizing efficiency."'
16
While a detailed analysis of the economics of monopolies is beyond
the scope of this Comment," I include a brief illustration of the mo-
nopoly problem: In a monopolized market, a monopolist will raise
prices." This increase in prices will decrease consumer demand and
thus cause the monopolist to decrease production (output).9 Accord-
ing to economic theory, this decreased output (the amount that would
have been consumed in a competitive market but that is not in a mo-
nopolistic market) represents a loss to society.'°
The Sherman Act provides two tools that can be used to combat
monopolies and thereby minimize inefficiency. Section 1 prohibits un-
reasonable restraints of trade (it need not be "prove[d] that [the] con-
certed activity threatens monopolization"21) effected by a "contract,
combination ... or conspiracy" between entities.22 It does not reach
conduct that is "wholly unilateral." Thus for Section 1 purposes, "you
must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy,"2 or, put an-
other way, a "plurality of actors"" is needed. On the other hand, Sec-
tion 2, which makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
16 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law:An Economic Perspective 20 (Chicago 1976). See also
Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J L & Econ 7, 7 (1966)
(asserting that "Congress intended the courts to implement ... only that value we would today
call [maximization of] consumer welfare" in drafting the Sherman Act).
17 For a detailed analysis of the costs of monopoly, see Posner, Antitrust Law at 8-22 (cited
in note 16).
18 See id at 9-10 (discussing the effect a monopolist may have on price).
19 See id (examining the relationship between price and output in a monopolized market).
20 See id (explaining the concept of social loss from monopoly). Posner argues that this
traditional calculation of social loss does not measure the full loss caused by monopolization.
It ignore[s] the fact that an opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form
of monopoly profits will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, and by
consumers to prevent being charged monopoly prices. The costs of the resources so used
are [also] costs of monopoly.
Id at 11.
21 Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Co, 467 US 752,768 (1984).
22 15 USC § 1.
23 Copperweld, 467 US at 768, quoting Albrecht v Herald Co, 390 US 145,149 (1968). See
also Columbia River People's Utility District v Portland General Electric Co, 217 F3d 1187, 1190
n 4 (9th Cir 2000) (same).
24 Nelson Radio & Supply Co, Inc v Motorola, Inc, 200 F2d 911,914 (5th Cir 1952).
25 Copperweld, 467 US at 769.
1404 [68:140t
2001] Partial Ownership of Subsidiaries and Antitrust Liability
lize ... any part of [ ] trade or commerce,"" governs unilateral conduct
by a single firm. Section 2 only applies to conduct that threatens actual
monopolization; "[iut is not enough that a single firm appears to 're-
strain trade' unreasonably."27 The Sherman Act apparently judges uni-
lateral activity less harshly than concerted activity because "'pure' uni-
lateral coordination within [a] firm [is] natural and efficient." Since
unilateral coordination "is as likely to result from an effort to compete
as from an effort to stifle competition,"29 policing unilateral conduct
with a vigor equal to that imposed on concerted conduct would likely
deter procompetitive corporate activities.'o
2. Sherman Act Section 1 and the rise of the
intra-enterprise conspiracy.
As mentioned above, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."'" In
analyzing a Section 1 claim, courts must confront the following
threshold question: is there a plurality of actors as required for con-
spiratorial liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act? If not, then
Section 1 cannot apply to the defendant's conduct, even if there is a
showing of anticompetitive harm.2
Whether there exists a plurality of actors is often a straightfor-
ward inquiry. For instance, courts widely accept the fact that unincor-
porated divisions of the same corporation do not satisfy the plurality
of actors requirement.3 This understanding seems intuitive: a corpora-
26 15 USC§ 2.
27 Copperweld, 467 US at 767.
28 Phillip Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 Harv L Rev 451,454 (1983).
29 Copperweld, 467 US at 769.
30 Id ("In the marketplace, [unilateral] coordination may be necessary if a business enter-
prise is to compete effectively.").
31 15 USC § 1. In order to establish a violation of this Section, a plaintiff must establish the
following four elements:
(1) that the defendants contracted, combined or conspired among each other; (2) that the
combination or conspiracy produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the relevant
product and geographic markets; (3) that the objects of and the conduct pursuant to that
contract or conspiracy were illegal; and (4) that the plaintiffs were injured as a proximate
result of that conspiracy.
Rossi v Standard Roofing, Inc, 156 F3d 452,464-65 (3d Cir 1998).
32 This does not mean that the defendants have not committed an antitrust violation. There
are several provisions that apply to anticompetitive unilateral conduct. For instance, a corpora-
tion or individual's behavior might violate Section 2 if it is an attempt to monopolize or leads to
actual monopolization. See 15 USC § 2 (making it a crime to "monopolize" or to "attempt to
monopolize"). For a further discussion of when Section 2 liability might be appropriate, see Part
III.D.2.b.
33 See, for example, Cliff Food Stores, Inc v Kroger, Inc, 417 F2d 203, 206 (5th Cir 1969)
(noting that courts have been reluctant to expand the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to un-
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tion must coordinate the efforts of its various departments to remain
competitive in its market, which is consistent with the Sherman Act's
goal of fostering competition. Traditionally, however, courts treated a
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary as two entities,
thus subjecting them to conspiratorial liability under Section 1.5 This
approach is commonly referred to as the "intra-enterprise conspiracy"
doctrine.
B. The Copperweld Doctrine: Conspiratorial Immunity for a Parent
and Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary
In the seminal case of Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube
Corp,"6 the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine as it related to a parent and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary." The Court began its analysis by stating that Section 1 of the
Sherman Act "does not reach conduct that is 'wholly unilateral.'' '.
Distinguishing between unilateral and concerted conduct, the Cop-
perweld Court explained, is necessary to effectuate the dual antitrust
goals of prohibiting coordinated and anticompetitive efforts of sepa-
rate economic actors while permitting (perhaps even encouraging) in-
trafirm cooperation aimed at healthy market competition.9
Since coordinated intrafirm efforts to compete are a healthy and
necessary part of a market system, officers or employees of the same
firm do not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a Section 1
conspiracy.Q The same reasoning, the Court held, applies to a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries:
incorporated divisions); Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc v Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd, 416
F2d 71, 83-84 (9th Cir 1969) (rejecting the proposition that the internal divisions of a single cor-
poration can conspire with each other); Poller v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 284 F2d 599,
603 (DC Cir 1960) (same), revd on other grounds, 368 US 464 (1962).
34 See text accompanying note 16.
35 See, for example, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc v International Parts Corp, 392 US 134,141-42
(1968) (suggesting that because the defendants "availed themselves of ... doing business through
separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save them from any of the obli-
gations that the law imposes on separate entities"); Timken Roller Bearing Co v United States,
341 US 593, 598 (1951) ("The fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting
corporations does not liberate them from the impact of [Section 1].").
36 467 US 752 (1984).
37 Id at 777 (overruling all prior decisions holding that a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary can conspire in violation of Section 1).
38 Id at 768, quoting Albrecht v Herald Co, 390 US 145,149 (1968).
39 467 US at 768-69 ("The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than
unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity is inherently fraught with anticom-
petitive risk.").
40 Id at 769. The rationale for not holding officers of a single corporation liable for antitrust
collusion is similar to the rationale for not holding departments or divisions of a single corpora-
tion liable for antitrust collusion as discussed in notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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[They] must be viewed as ... a single enterprise for purposes of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary
have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common,
not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or de-
termined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but
41
one.
Indeed, the Court noted the irreconcilable tension that would re-
sult in holding a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
liable for conspiracy. Section 1 "agreement" (required for conspiracy)
only occurs "when 'the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a com-
mon design and understanding ... in an unlawful arrangement.' But in
reality a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have a 'unity of
purpose or a common design.'
'42
The Court concluded that for wholly owned subsidiaries the in-
tra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine "impose[s] grave legal conse-
quences upon organizational distinctions that are of de minimis mean-
ing and effect.4 3 Thus, after Copperweld, a plaintiff cannot allege an
antitrust violation based on an "intra-enterprise conspiracy" when the
subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent corporation."
II. CONSPIRACY BETWEEN A PARENT AND ITS PARTIALLY
OWNED SUBSIDIARY
Although Copperweld settled the conspiracy issue between a
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, it did "not consider un-
der what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring
with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own."4 Still,
many courts have taken the liberty of applying the Copperweld ra-
tionale to conspiracy allegations between a parent and its partially
owned subsidiaries. The results have been neither uniform nor consis-
tent.
All the courts that have considered the issue have defined the
relevant inquiry using the same language as Copperweld: Do the cor-
41 Id at 771.
42 Id, quoting American Tobacco Co v United States, 328 US 781,810 (1946).
43 Copperweld, 467 US at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Sunkist Grow-
ers, Inc v Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co, 370 US 19, 29 (1962).
4 This Comment primarily concerns liability of a parent corporation, but the analysis
equally applies to individuals who own the entirety or a large portion of a corporation. For in-
stance, if a single individual owns two corporations, that person could not conspire with either
one since there is not a plurality of actors. See text accompanying notes 24-25. Likewise, the two
"subsidiary" corporations could not conspire with each other since they share common owner-
ship. Therefore, it makes no difference whether the parent is an actual person or a corporate en-
tity for purposes of Section 1. However, for simplicity, this Comment will continue the discussion
in the context of the parent being a corporation.
45 467 Us at 767.
1407
1408 The University of Chicago Law Review [68:1401
porations have a complete "unity of purpose" so as to make an
agreement between them meaningless in Sherman Act terms?46 Most
courts refer to one of two approaches as a guide in determining
whether a unity of purpose exists: (1) the de minimis approach, which
requires ownership nearing 100 percent for immunity; or (2) the con-
trol approach, which grants immunity whenever the parent has legal
control over the subsidiary.
Other courts have endorsed neither of these approaches and used
"unity of purpose" as a naked standard, without an in-depth discus-
sion about what qualifies as a unified interest. These courts typically
conduct factfinding and then simply announce, in a seemingly arbi-
trary fashion, whether the corporations have met the standard or not.7
Of the courts that do purport to apply one of the two main ap-
proaches, many complicate the problem by citing authority that more
accurately supports the other view."
A. The De Minimis Approach
Even though the Copperweld Court specifically left open the
question of when a parent could conspire with its partially owned sub-
sidiaries," lower courts were quick to seize on the reasoning that the
46 See, for example, Total Benefit Services, Inc v Group Insurance Administration, Inc, 875 F
Supp 1228,1239 (E D La 1995) (quoting Copperweld's "unity of purpose" language); Rosen v
Hyundai Group (Korea), 829 F Supp 41,45 n 6 (E D NY 1993) (same).
47 See, for example, Rohlfing v Manor Care, Inc, 172 FRD 330,344-45 (N D Ill 1997) (hold-
ing that 82.3 percent ownership of a subsidiary qualified the parent for immunity from antitrust
conspiracy); Total Benefit Services, 875 F Supp at 1239 (holding the same for 95 percent owner-
ship); Rosen, 829 F Supp at 45 n 6 (holding the same for 80 percent ownership).
48 See, for example, Coast Cities Truck Sales, Inc v Navistar International Transportation Co,
912 F Supp 747, 764 (D NJ 1995), citing Novatel Communications Inc v Cellular Telephone Sup-
ply, Inc, 1986 US Dist LEXIS 16017 (N D Ga) (using a control approach, but then seemingly ap-
plying a de minimis approach); Siegel Transfer, Inc v Carrier Express, Inc, 856 F Supp 990, 997 (E
D Pa 1994), affd, 54 F3d 1125 (3d Cir 1995) (noting that the legal standard is "the power of a
parent to control a subsidiary," but then citing Aspen Title & Escrow v Jeld-Wen, Inc, 677 F Supp
1477, 1486 (D Or 1987), which uses a de minimis approach); Bell Atlantic Business Systems Ser-
vices v Hitachi Data Systems Corp, 849 F Supp 702, 706 (N D Cal 1994) (reviewing the facts
based on whether the parent corporation has "legal control" over the subsidiary, but citing Leaco
Enterprises, Inc v General Electric Co, 737 F Supp 605, 608-09 (D Or 1990), which uses a de
minimis standard). Sometimes this happens when a court is applying the de minimis approach in
favor of the defendant. When a parent owns nearly a complete interest in the subsidiary (interest
percentages in the high nineties), then both approaches will yield a decision in favor of the de-
fendant. In this situation, some courts announce or apply a de minimis rule, the more restrictive
of the two approaches, but then cite cases that rely on the more liberal control approach. See, for
example, Coast Cities, 912 F Supp at 764. Although this does not affect the result of the particu-
lar case, the vacillation of courts from one approach to another creates substantial confusion
when later courts (and attorneys) try to deduce the proposition for which the precedent stands.
More troubling are the instances where the court applies a control approach but cites de minimis
precedent. See, for example, Siegel Transfer, 856 F Supp at 997; Bell Atlantic, 849 F Supp at 706.
Here, the court's mistaken reading of precedent may affect the ultimate outcome of the case.
49 See text accompanying note 45.
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Court employed. The first courts to consider the issue held that a "de
minimus [sic] difference between [the parent's] percentage of owner-
ship and 100 percent ownership does not diminish Copperweld's ap-
plicability."'' Two of the most cited cases standing for the de minimis
approach come from the District of Oregon. The first, Aspen Title &
Escrow, Inc v Jeld-Wen, Inc,' explicitly recognized and rejected the
competing control approach.52 The court reasoned that "a controlling
shareholder having less than all shares might lack a unity of purpose
and interest with the controlled corporation." Perhaps realizing that
this might sound like a denouncement of the Copperweld doctrine in
any situation where the subsidiary is not wholly owned, the court then
quickly stated "that only corporations which are owned 100% ... or a
de minimis amount less than 100%, are covered by the Copperweld
rule.'"" The court did not expound upon what would qualify as a de
minimis amount, except to find that the corporation was not protected
from liability for conspiring with its 60 and 75 percent owned subsidi-
50 Satellite Financial Planning Corp v First National Bank of Wilmington, 633 F Supp 386,
395 (D Del 1986). Satellite was one of the first cases setting forth the de minimis approach. See
also Siegel Transfer, Inc v Carrier Express, Inc, 856 F Supp 990, 997 (E D Pa 1994) (using the
same language as Satellite), affd, 54 F3d 1125 (3d Cir 1995). But compare Tunis Brothers Co, Inc
v Ford Motor Co, 763 F2d 1482, 1495 n 20 (3d Cir 1985), vacd on other grounds, 475 US 1105
(1986), which is another early case and one of the few cases that a circuit court has heard on the
issue. It held that "Copperweld [did] not ... preclude a conspiratorial relationship" between a
parent and a partially owned subsidiary. Id. That court held that liability could exist, even though
the parent owned 79 percent of the equity stock and 100 percent of the voting stock. Id at 1486.
It is not clear from the decision whether the Third Circuit was rejecting the applicability of Cop-
perweld entirely or whether it was applying the de minimis approach and felt that the de minimis
difference had not been met. If the court intended the latter, then the result is somewhat suspect
given that the parent owned 100 percent of the voting stock. See Rohlfing v Manor Care, Inc, 172
FRD 330,344 n 21 (N D Ill 1997) (calling the Tunis outcome "particularly questionable"). In any
event, the Third Circuit clarified its position to some extent in Siegel Transfer, 54 F3d at 1133 &
nn 7-8 (affirming an application of the de minimis approach when the parent owned 99.92 per-
cent and also noting that some courts had applied Copperweld "to situations where parental
ownership was in the 80% to 91.9% range").
51 677 F Supp 1477 (D Or 1987).
52 Id at 1486, rejecting Novatel Communications, Inc v Cellular Telephone Supply, Inc, 1986
US Dist LEXIS 16017 (N D Ga).
53 Aspen Title, 677 F Supp at 1486.
54 Id (emphasis added). The court claimed to adopt this standard from Sonitrol of Fresno,
Inc v American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 1986 US Dist LEXIS 26034 (D DC), but it is not at
all clear that Sonitrol advocates the de minimis approach. In that case, the court was considering
a parent that owned less than 50 percent of its subsidiaries. The court ruled against the parent,
stating:
[Wihile [the parent] may have undoubtedly de facto control over [the subsidiaries], legal
control of these corporations rested firmly in the hands of their board of directors. As long
as these boards had the legal ability to determine the course of business activity for their
corporation independently of [the parent], they were capable of conspiring.
Id at *13. Nowhere in the opinion does the court mention or allude to a de minimis standard. So,
contrary to the reading by Aspen Title, Sonitrol arguably advocates the control approach, which
is discussed in detail in Part II.B.
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aries but could not have conspired with its 97.5 percent owned sub-
sidiary.5 Later, in Leaco Enterprises, Inc v General Electric Co,56 the
Oregon court again announced its use of the de minimis approach,
this time finding for the parent.7 The parent in Leaco owned 91.9 per-
cent of the subsidiary in question and the court was satisfied that this
met its previously undefined standard set forth in Aspen Title." How-
ever, in arriving at this conclusion, the court discussed at some length
the ability of the parent to compel the merger of the subsidiary if it so
desired.9 Since the ability to compel a merger is generally irrelevant to
a de minimis analysis (almost any parent could compel a merger of a
91.9 percent owned subsidiary), this dictum seems to leave open the
possibility that the District of Oregon might not be constrained in the
future from applying a control-type standard."
The only federal circuit court of appeals to have addressed di-
rectly the application of Copperweld to partially owned subsidiaries
has supported use of the de minimis approach. In Siegel Transfer, Inc v
Carrier Express, Inc,1 the Third Circuit affirmed a lower court's appli-
cation of the de minimis rule." Although Siegel does lend some sup-
port for that approach, it is not the best case for concluding that the de
minimis approach should be the universal standard, since the defen-
dant there owned over 99 percent of the subsidiary's shares.0 Thus, the
de minimis approach was the narrowest rule to grant immunity to the
defendants. It seems that the Third Circuit might have embraced the
control approach had it been necessary to save the defendants from
liability. At one point, the court stated that "under Copperweld, the
control a parent corporation exercises over its subsidiary is relevant,
not whether a parent operates the subsidiary separately." The court
also acknowledged the application of Copperweld immunity to owner-
ship levels below the de minimis level by other courts.5 In the end, the
court seemed content to rest its decision on the narrower de minimis
rule applied by the lower court. Thus, the only circuit court to have
55 Aspen Title, 677 F Supp at 1482, 1486.
56 737 F Supp 605 (D Or 1990).
57 Id at 608-09.
58 Id at 609.
59 Id (discussing merger rules under Canadian corporation law).
60 The Leaco court is not the only court that has been somewhat apologetic in its adoption
of the de minimis standard. See, for example, Siegel Transfer, 54 F3d at 1133 n 7 (recognizing the
control approach, but not expressly rejecting the de minimis standard).
61 54 F3d 1125 (3d Cir 1995).
62 Id at 1134.
63 Idat 1133.
64 Id at 1134 n 10 (emphasis added).
65 Id at 1133 n7.
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addressed the issue did relatively little to produce a definitive stan-
dard."'
While it is generally accepted that ownership interests approach-
ing 100 percent will satisfy the de minimis requirement, courts have
struggled to determine where de minimis ends. Courts have held that
parent ownerships of 99.92 percent," 97.5 percent,' and 91.9 percent"
are de minimis differences for the purpose of applying Copperweld.
On the other hand, courts have found parent ownerships of 75 per-
cent,0 60 percent,7' and 54 percent72 not to be de minimis, thus leaving
the corporations open to Sherman Act Section 1 liability. Although
the de minimis courts have never specified a bright line rule requiring
a certain percentage for immunity, it is interesting to note that the
cases that have been decided map closely to the Treasury Regulations
standard for control of a corporation. Under these provisions, a per-
son or corporation is considered to be in "control" of a corporation if
it owns 80 percent of the total voting stock and 80 percent of all out-
standing common stock.73 The corollary between the two might be
mere coincidence, as no court has explicitly mentioned or endorsed
the use of the regulations in drawing a line for de minimis analysis, nor
has any court expressly considered both voting stock and common
stock. Further, since the sample size of cases within the range of 75 to
90 percent is so small, it is not clear that the courts are actually aiming
for the 80 percent line that the regulations mandate. Still, the regula-
tions might indicate that there is something more concrete to the de
minimis cutoff than is evident from the case law.
B. The Control Approach
Other courts, applying the rationale of Copperweld more liberally
to partially owned subsidiaries, have adopted a control approach. Un-
66 The Third Circuit also previously considered the issue shortly after Copperweld, but it is
unclear on what basis it made its final decision. See Tunis, 763 F2d at 1495 n 20 (asserting merely
that Copperweld does not preclude a conspiratorial relationship in violation of Section 1 when
the subsidiary is not wholly owned). The Tunis decision has been widely criticized for denying
immunity to a parent owning 79 percent of a subsidiary's equity stock and 100 percent of voting
stock. It was not discussed in Siegel Transfer. For further discussion of the issues regarding Tunis,
see note 50.
67 Siegel Transfer, 54 F3d at 1133.
68 Aspen Title, 677 F Supp at 1482, 1486.
69 Leaco, 737 F Supp at 609.
70 Aspen Title, 677 F Supp at 1486 (holding that of three subsidiaries, only the one in which
the parent had 97.5 percent ownership met the de minimis standard).
71 Id.
72 American Vision Centers, Inc v Cohen, 711 F Supp 721,722-23 (E D NY 1989) (noting
that although 54 percent ownership of common stock gave the parent control. "the other 46% of
the stock represented an economic interest different from that of [the parents]").
73 26 CFR § 1.351-1 (1996). See also 26 USC § 368(c) (1994).
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der this standard, courts do not require that the parent corporation
possess an ownership interest in the subsidiary nearing 100 percent.
Rather, the inquiry centers on whether the parent corporation can le-
gally control the subsidiary." At the outset, it is important to note that
a corporation qualifying for immunity under the de minimis approach
will almost certainly qualify for immunity under the control approach,
since the percentage of ownership needed to control a corporation is
almost always lower than the percentage needed to qualify as a de
minimis difference.
The most notable of the control approach cases is Novatel Com-
munications, Inc v Cellular Telephone Supply, Inc." Novatel, a Cana-
dian corporation that manufactured cellular telephones, owned 51
percent of Carcom, a Texas corporation formed to market Novatel cel-
lular telephones to the automotive industry." The other 49 percent of
Carcom was owned by a single investment group, so that Carcom was
essentially controlled by two corporations with nearly equal stakes in
the operation." The Novatel court held that the 51 percent ownership
interest made the parent corporation incapable of conspiring for pur-
poses of Section 1. The court reasoned that "[t]he 51 percent owner-
ship retained by [the parent corporation] assured it of full control over
[the subsidiary] and assured it could intervene at any time that [the
subsidiary] ceased to act in its best interests."9 The plaintiff attempted
to counter this showing of "unity of purpose" by introducing a manu-
facturer's agreement between Novatel and Carcom that provided:
"this Agreement does not constitute Carcom as an agent or employee
of Novatel.... Carcom shall be deemed to be an independent contrac-
tor." Citing Copperweld, the court dismissed this howing of inde-
pendent purpose, stating that the majority ownership interest was con-
trolling regardless of whether the parent "keeps a tight reign [sic] over
74 See Coast Cities Truck Sales, Inc v Navistar International Transportation Co, 912 F Supp
747,765-66 (D NJ 1995) (holding that a 70 percent ownership of the voting shares by the parent
corporation was sufficient to establish control, and thus, unity of purpose); Bell Atlantic Business
Systems Services v Hitachi Data Systems Corp, 849 F Supp 702,706 (N D Cal 1994) (explicitly re-
jecting the de minimis rule, and finding that the parent company had "the power to exercise full
control over its subsidiary" because of its 80 percent ownership). See also Phillip E. Areeda, 7
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application I 1467a at 259 (Little,
Brown 1986) (concluding that "majority ownership with its centralized power to control ... pre-
sumptively creates a single entity for antitrust purposes").
75 1986 US Dist LEXIS 16017 (N D Ga).
76 Id at *1-2.
77 Id at *2.
78 Id at *25-26.
79 Id. But see Sonitrol of Fresno, Inc v American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 1986 US Dist
LEXIS 26034, *12-15 (D DC) (holding that the fact that a parent had a 32.6 percent interest and
de facto control did not preclude conspiratorial liability since it did not give the parent corpora-
tion legal control, which remained with the subsidiary's board of directors).
80 Novatel, 1986 US Dist LEXIS 16017 at *26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the subsidiary."'" Thus, under the Novatel court's articulation of the
control approach, it appears that a simple majority ownership will suf-
fice to apply Copperweld immunity2 Although Novatel is the only
court using the control approach to decide a case near 50 percent, no
court has ever denied immunity for a percentage ownership greater
than 50 percent.
One court has hinted at a variation of the control approach that is
even more expansive than Novatel. In Coast Cities Truck Sales, Inc v
Navistar International Transportation Co,n a court considered whether
a parent corporation could conspire with its partially owned, inde-
pendently incorporated dealcorw Over the course of several years, the
parent's ownership fluctuated between 70 and 100 percent of the vot-
ing shares of the dealcorY The court's analysis began by stating that
"[clourts examining the substance, rather than the form of the eco-
nomic arrangement, may initially engage in a bright line analysis of
whether a subsidiary is wholly owned."" When the subsidiary is not
wholly owned, then a "court must next determine whether the parent
and subsidiary are inextricably intertwined in the same corporate mis-
sion, are bound by the same interests which are affected by the same
occurrences, and exist to accomplish essentially the same objectives.' '
The Coast Cities court then listed several factors to consider when de-
termining whether the parent "asserts total dominion" over the sub-
sidiary. These include "management control, contractual obligations,
[and] economic incentives., Although the court eventually decided
the case based upon the parent's ability to "dictate the objectives and
actions of each dealcor" through the control of voting shares"- closely
Sl Id at *25.
82 The court in Novatel did not explicitly discuss whether the parent owned a majority of
the voting stock as well as the common stock. Since the court mentioned the ability of the parent
to "assert full control at any time," id, it might be possible to infer that the parent did indeed own
51 percent or more of the voting stock. Although this detail was not expressly discussed by the
district court, it is a factor that has been considered by other courts, see, for example, Coast Cities,
912 F Supp at 765 (reviewing various factors relevant to a violation of Section 1 by a parent cor-
poration and its subsidiary, including the ability of the parent to "assert[] total dominion over
[the subsidiary's] actions"), and in this Comment's proposed approach. See Part III.B.
83 912 F Supp 747 (D NJ 1995).
84 Id at 764-66.




89 Id. The opinion in Rohlfing v Manor Care, Inc, 172 FRD 330 (N D I11 1997), shares strik-
ing similarities with the reasoning in Coast Cities. Both courts relied heavily on the ownership re-
lationship in deciding the cases, and, like the Coast Cities court, the Rohifing court implied that
other facts might be considered, stating that "unity of interest may be established if the economic
objectives of the corporations are interdependent or if the management of one company exerts
almost complete control over the other." Id at 344-45.
90 Coast Cities, 912 F Supp at 765.
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resembling previous "control approach" analysis-the preceding lan-
guage indicates a possible willingness to delve into a fact-intensive in-
quiry that is not required under a more traditional control approach,
which focuses only upon the percentage ownership of stock or voting
stock.9' Under this articulation of the control approach, de facto con-
trol of a subsidiary might be enough to immunize the parent corpora-
tion from conspiratorial liability, even if legal control is, in a technical
sense, lacking." No court has actually used the fact-sensitive control
approach to determine the outcome of a case.
III. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING COPPERWELD
TO PARTIALLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES
This Comment proposes a two-part framework for analyzing anti-
trust conspiratorial liability as it applies to partially owned subsidiar-
ies. Under this approach, a parent corporation would be extended Sec-
tion 1 immunity if: (1) the parent has a legally controlling interest in
the voting stock of the subsidiary, and (2) the parent owns a majority
of the common stock of the subsidiary.
Part III.A will describe the rule and its mechanics. Part III.B will
explore the need for the voting control component of the test. Part
III.C will do the same for the economic interest component. Finally,
Part III.D will examine the policy advantages of the proposed ap-
proach.
A. Mechanics of the Proposed Rule
This Comment takes a unique approach to analyzing Section 1
conspiratorial liability for a parent and its partially owned subsidiary.
It requires courts to look at two key, readily available pieces of infor-
mation before determining whether the parent and subsidiary should
be afforded immunity from Section 1 conspiratorial liability. The first
factor courts should look at is the ability of the parent to legally con-
trol the subsidiary.
Although the law defines "control" in many ways and in many
different places,3 the concept of "legal control" in Copperweld is based
on the ability of the parent to "assert full control at any moment" over
91 See Bell Atlantic, 849 F Supp at 706 ("Under the reasoning of Copperweld and its prog-
eny, it is not necessary to conduct a factual inquiry to determine whether a parent and a subsidi-
ary over which the parent has legal control can conspire in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.").
92 But see Sonitrol, 1986 US Dist LEXIS 26034 at *13 (holding that although the parent
had de facto control, it was still subject to Section 1 liability since it did not have legal control of
the subsidiary).
93 See Part I.B.
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the subsidiary.' A parent corporation has this type of legal control
over a subsidiary when it has the controlling voting interest or by
ownership of a percentage of the voting stock specified by the subsidi-
ary's articles of incorporation or by state incorporation law." A con-
trolling voting interest assures the parent of the ability to determine
the direction of the subsidiary corporation in two ways: (1) by electing
a majority of the directors, who in turn will determine the officers of
the corporation, and (2) by voting (decisively) on "fundamental mat-
ters" that are put to a shareholder vote." For purposes of applying the
Copperweld doctrine, the ability to control on "fundamental matters"
is crucial, because it is necessary to force a merger, dissolution, or oth-
erwise "assert full control at any moment." Although a simple major-
ity quorum is the default rule for both general and fundamental mat-
ters under most states' corporation laws,97 a corporation's articles of
incorporation may specify a greater quorum, thus requiring a "super-
majority" for shareholder voting.'8 Supermajority provisions have be-
come increasingly popular because of their "utility ... as a way of pro-
tecting minority investors who need veto power over some matters"
and "as a takeover defense mechanism."", Correspondingly, a corpora-
tion that does not possess a necessary supermajority cannot be as-
sured complete control.
Rather than adopt a pure "majority quorum" or "supermajority
quorum" for all matters, many corporations have adopted a hybrid
voting structure, requiring a supermajority quorum for fundamental
matters and a majority quorum for everything else. In these situations,
this Comment's approach would grant immunity only where the par-
ent had the voting share required for "fundamental matters"-that is,
the supermajority percentage.
The second relevant fact in determining whether a parent and
subsidiary have a unity of purpose-and thereby immunity-is the
94 467 US at 771-72.
95 See James D. Cox, Thomas Lee Hazen, and F. Hodge O'Neal, 1 Corporations § 1:21 (As-
pen 2001) (1998-2 Supp).
96 Under most state statutes, "fundamental matters" requiring a shareholder vote include:
"(1) mergers involving the corporation .... (2) any amendment to the certificate of incorpora-
tion, (3) the sale of substantially all the corporation's assets, and (4) liquidation." William A.
Klein and John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Princi-
ples 119 (Foundation 7th ed 2000).
97- See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 216(2) (1991) (noting that "the affirmative vote of
the majority of shares ... shall be [considered an] act of the stockholders").
98 Id § 216 ("[Tlhe certificate of incorporation or bylaws of any corporation ... may specify
the number of shares ... which shall be present ... in order to constitute a quorum."); Model
Business Corporation Act § 7.27(a) (West 2001) ("The articles of incorporation may provide for
greater quorum or voting requirement for shareholders ... than is provided by this Act.").
99 Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee, Jr., and Ronald J. Gilson, Cases and Materials on
Corporations 578 (Aspen 4th ed 1995).
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parent's ownership level of common stock. A parent and subsidiary
would only be granted immunity if, in addition to the parent having a
controlling voting share, the parent owns a majority of all the subsidi-
ary's outstanding shares of common stock. As explained later,°4 the
requirement of common stock ownership, or an "economic stake,"
promotes antitrust policy by providing safeguards against a vote-
controlling parent strategically undermining the competitiveness of a
subsidiary for its own benefit. Again, both elements must be satisfied
before immunity is granted. An extremely high percentage ownership
of the common stock does not offset an otherwise inadequate owner-
ship of the voting stock, and vice versa.
Traditional analyses under either the de minimis or control ap-
proach have typically obscured the distinction between majority stock
ownership and majority voting stock ownership. Some courts have
pursued their analyses using stock ownership (usually in a de minimis
analysis),'01 others using voting stock ownership (usually in a control
analysis),04 and still others have referred to both or have not specified
which percentages they are using to arrive at their conclusions.3 It is
not at all clear what leads courts to use various or unspecified meth-
ods. One possible reason for the ambiguity may be that in some cases
the choice may have little effect on the outcome,' so the court fails to
engage in a complete analysis.
Copperweld itself does not bifurcate the inquiry into "economic
stake" and "control" as this Comment proposes. The reason for this is
straightforward: in dealing with wholly owned subsidiaries, the bifur-
cated analysis is unnecessary. The parent of a wholly owned subsidiary
will necessarily be the only party having an economic stake in, and
control over, the subsidiary. But despite the fact that an individual
analysis of both factors was not needed to decide Copperweld, both
are necessary for deciding cases of partially owned subsidiaries consis-
tently with the antitrust goals underlying Copperweld.
B. Voting Stock Requirement
In granting Section 1 immunity to a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary, the Copperweld Court developed the concept of "unity of
purpose" in part by pointing to the control that the parent can exert
100 See Part III.C.
101 See, for example, Leaco, 737 F Supp at 608-09.
102 See, for example, Coast Cities, 912 F Supp at 764-66.
103 See, for example, Novatel, 1986 US Dist LEXIS 16017 at *25-26.
104 For example, if the defendant parent owned a very high (or low) percentage of the
common stock and a similarly high (or low) percentage of the voting stock, then differentiating
between the two would not greatly affect the court's analysis.
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over the subsidiary."', When the parent fails to maintain a controlling
portion of voting stock, there is a sound reason for denying immunity.
For instance, even to refer to corporations with minority shares of the
voting stock as "parents" of "subsidiaries" is perhaps a stretch. A
"parent corporation" is technically "[a] corporation that has a control-
ling interest in another corporation ... through ownership of more
than one-half the voting stock,""' although courts appear to be more
liberal than that in applying the labels of "parent" and "subsidiary.""
That a "parent" of this sort does not have a unity of purpose with its
"subsidiary" is made more evident when the purposes behind a dual-
class common stock structure-authorizing voting and nonvoting (or
lower-vote) shares-are considered. Typically, a dual-class structure is
instituted as a "device for concentrating voting power in the hands of
the managers and their allies and thereby barring any threat to their
incumbency and autonomy."'. Thus, a corporation that has only a mi-
nority of the voting stock in a subsidiary, while maintaining a majority
of the overall common stock, very likely has this structure for a good
reason."' The shareholders that have voting control of the subsidiary
most likely structured the subsidiary so that the corporation would
not attain voting control. With such an adversarial purpose for the
dual-class structure, it would be awkward to talk of a noncontrolling
corporation having a unity of purpose with the subsidiary corporation.
But what of the situation in which a "parent" does not own a le-
gally controlling portion of the voting stock, but owns enough of the
voting stock so that it is in de facto control of the corporation? Such a
situation might arise if P, the parent, owned 30 percent of the voting
stock in S, the subsidiary. If the other 70 percent of the voting stock
were dispersed among a large number of other shareholders, such that
P's voting share dwarfed that of the other owners, then P probably
would have a very influential role in shaping the policy of S. One
might think that, in this situation, P and S have a unity of purpose. A
closer look, however, reveals that this cannot be the case. P might in-
deed have de facto control of S, but this control is at the pleasure of
the dispersed voters. If P ever directs S in a way that is controversial,
the dispersed voters have the incentive and the ability to form a coali-
tion against P, thereby quickly stripping it of control. A corporation in
the position of P could never unilaterally force the subsidiary to pur-
sue a certain course of action, nor could it force S to be absorbed by P
105 467 US at 771-72.
106 Black's Law Dictionary at 344 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
107 See note 3.
108 Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 121 (cited in note 96).
109 See id at 120-21 (discussing the reasons shareholders would accept nonvoting stock or
any class of stock that carried disproportionate voting power).
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through a statutory merger, which would require the vote on a "fun-
damental matter" (likely by a supermajority).
The Copperweld Court recognized that the important considera-
tion is whether the parent has the ability to legally control, not
whether it in fact micromanages the subsidiary on a day-to-day basis.
Copperweld states that a "unity of purpose" exists when a parent has
the ability to control a subsidiary, "whether or not the parent keeps a
tight reign [sic] over the subsidiary.... Thus, a parent that lacks legal
control, but nonetheless keeps a tight rein on a subsidiary through de
facto control, has not satisfied this element of the test. On the other
hand, a parent that owns the requisite shares of voting stock has satis-
fied this element, regardless of whether it is active in the day-to-day
affairs of the subsidiary.
C. Common Stock Requirement
Unlike the control element,' common stock ownership was not
separately identified as an element of the Court's holding in Copper-
weld. As mentioned above,2 since Copperweld only addressed the
situation of the wholly owned subsidiary, it was not necessary to deal
with voting stock and common stock separately. However, the under-
lying policy rationale of the Court's decision justifies inquiring into
common stock ownership when dealing with partially owned subsidi-
aries. In deciding that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary could
not conspire under Section 1, the Court drew an analogy to coordi-
nated activity among officers of the same firm. A firm's officers are
not subject to Section 1 liability, the Court stated, because they are not
"pursuing divergent [economic] goals."1 Instead, they are pursuing
the same economic goals: those of the firm. Rather than being suspect,
the Court noted that this was "an effort to compete," which is what the
Sherman Act (and antitrust laws in general) seeks to promote."' The
Court held that "[for] similar reasons, the coordinated activity of a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a
single enterprise..".
When a parent owns a majority of its subsidiary's common stock,
it possesses the greatest economic stake in the success or failure of
that subsidiary. The parent is entitled to the residual equity interest,
110 472 US at 771.
111 See text accompanying notes 142-47 for a discussion of the role that a parent's control
of a subsidiary played in Copperweld.
112 See Part I.B.
113 Copperweld, 467 US at 769.
114 Id.
115 Id at 771.
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namely, "what is left after all [fixed claims] have been satisfied.'". The
higher the level of the parent's ownership interest, the more closely its
economic goals become aligned-or using Copperweld's terminology,
cease to be "divergent" -with that of the subsidiary corporation. This
common goal is to maximize profits. If a significant percentage of
common stock ownership were not required of a parent corporation,
then there would be a risk of strategic behavior on the part of the par-
ent to the detriment of consumers.
Consider the following example: A company involved in the oil
refining business has a controlling vote in Shell, a retail level gas sta-
tion chain. Although the parent has a controlling vote share in Shell, it
only owns 1 percent of the common stock.' Because the parent has a
relatively small capital investment in Shell, it may be quite willing to
engage in behavior detrimental to Shell, through either horizontal or
vertical collusive agreements, if it will benefit the parent by exceeding
the value lost by the decline in the value of Shell stock (of which the
parent bears only 1 percent)." The result is that the parent's actions
cause Shell to become an uncompetitive player in the retail gas mar-
ket, and consumers (not to mention the common stock holders of
Shell) suffer harm. To change the scenario slightly, assume the parent
owns 70 percent of Shell's common stock. Shell now has an incentive
not to engage in collusive behavior that will be detrimental to its
competitiveness, because it would bear 70 percent of the risk of loss to
Shell's stock value. In fact, the parent has an incentive to control Shell
in a way that maximizes Shell's profits consistent will Shell's corporate
goals.'
Having considered the case for including common stock owner-
ship in the partial subsidiary test, the issue remains as to what level of
ownership is needed to ensure that the parent's business purpose is to
maximize the wealth of the subsidiary. One possibility would be to re-
116 Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 271 (cited in note 96).
117 It may be unusual for a shareholder to hold a majority of the voting stock, but only 1
percent of the common stock. However, it is not impossible. In addition, a slightly less extreme
example would certainly not strain the imagination. For instance, a parent might very well own
10 percent of common stock and still control the voting shares. A common example of this would
be a closely held corporation that goes public.
118 How could the parent possibly gain by causing Shell to become uncompetitive? This
could happen horizontally, if the parent was also involved directly in the retail gas market; or it
could happen vertically, if the parent had a contract (or perhaps another parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship) with one of Shell's competitors.
119 Some might argue that the parent may still be willing to engage in collusive practices
that harm Shell if the payoff is high enough. Although this might be true, a rational parent would
first unload a major portion of its common stock in Shell (while maintaining voting control) be-
fore undertaking activity that would harm Shell and ultimately itself as shareholder. At this
point, the parent would fail to satisfy the ownership component of the test and would be liable
for collusive conduct under Section 1.
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quire an ownership level of 80 or 90 percent, as the de minimis ap-
proach currently does. But using the de minimis standard as a guide
seems unwarranted. The courts that have applied this standard have
done so as a way of relaxing the Copperweld rule slightly, without dar-
ing to search for the broader antitrust policy underlying it. This is a
conservative approach without an articulated policy basis.'21 A parent
owning a majority of the common stock will have the incentive to
maximize the subsidiary's wealth. This would still thereby discourage
anticompetitive collusion at levels of ownership below that of the de
minimis approach. This Comment suggests the requirement of major-
ity ownership because a greater than 50 percent ownership interest
will adequately deter parents from causing their subsidiaries to engage
in anticompetitive activities with unprofitable or inefficient results.
It could be argued that an ownership level of 50 percent is not
required to align the incentives of the parent with those of its subsidi-
ary and therefore benefit consumers-that a much lower percentage
ownership would accomplish the same end. Under this premise, an
ownership level of 30 or 35 percent might be sufficient in some cases.
The problem with this approach is that a similar argument might be
made that 30 or 35 percent ownership is also unnecessary to ensure
that the parent will not engage in anticompetitive collusion at the ex-
pense of the subsidiary. Thus, no line would ever be drawn. While any
bright line rule of common stock ownership will certainly have a de-
gree of arbitrariness-for example, 50 percent instead of 49 percent-
it is no more arbitrary than allowing judges to determine in a case-by-
case fashion whether a specific percentage had the desired incentive
effect on the controlling corporation's mental state, a process bound
to be fraught with error costs. In addition, this Comment's "line" is less
arbitrary than other possible lines, because it rests on the assumption
that a parent corporation is more likely to engage in strategic behav-
ior when dealing with a subsidiary that is primarily owned by some-
body else, rather than one that it alone primarily owns.
D. Policy Benefits
This Comment's proposal offers several advantages over existing
approaches. It provides a workable, straightforward test for judges to
apply, thereby reducing decision and error costs. More importantly, it
furthers the antitrust policy of protecting consumers and accurately
120 The Treasury Regulations also use an 80 percent standard in measuring the relationship
between a shareholder and a corporation. See note 73 and accompanying text. But because they
deal only with tax consequences, it is doubtful that they were drafted with the intention of pro-
moting effective antitrust incentives. Thus, they may not provide the most appropriate level for
purposes of this test.
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preserves the distinction between concerted and unilateral activity
that is at the heart of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.21 Furthermore, it
provides incentives that are consistent with other areas of the law, yet
it does not render separate doctrinal areas meaningless.
1. Judicial economy.
Like the traditional de minimis and control approaches, the pro-
posed approach demands little factfinding. Judges, with the test in
hand, simply look to corporate records to determine whether the par-
ent owns the two types of stock in the requisite amounts. It is true that
this approach requires slightly more factfinding than the previous ap-
proaches; here, the judge must look at both common stock ownership
and voting stock ownership, rather than just one or the other. But this
extra burden is so light that it is probably insignificant. To the extent
the burden is substantial, it is outweighed by the fact that the judge no
longer has to decide which type of stock to use in his or her analysis.'
1
More importantly, this approach is a marked improvement over
the de minimis approach, since it establishes a bright line rule for
judges to follow. Although most jurisdictions applying the de minimis
approach consistently grant immunity when the percentage ownership
is in the 90s, it is unclear when an ownership level ceases to be "de
minimis." Thus, in the hard range of cases (around 80 percent), the
judge must make a judgment call. This approach increases the likeli-
hood of error, thereby creating decision costs. Even though bright line
rules sometimes run the risk of being over- or underinclusive, this
Comment's rule will likely produce more accurate results than the hit-
or-miss style of the de minimis approach.3 At the very least, it will es-
tablish a standard that is concrete and certain, which will be welcomed
by plaintiffs and defendants.
2. Harmony with antitrust policy.
a) Benefits to consumers. Under the banner of protecting con-
sumers, pre-Copperweld courts forbade a parent and a wholly owned
subsidiary from undertaking coordinated conduct. The Court finally
realized that this actually hurt consumers by prohibiting
procompetitive and efficient conduct by the parent and subsidiary. The
121 See notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
122 This assumes that judges consider the implications of using one over the other. A more
pessimistic view is that they do not consider the different possibilities in a Section 1 claim and
use whatever is most convenient. In this situation, there probably is no conserving of judicial re-
sources.
123 This defect of the de minimis approach makes it inferior to even the traditional control
approach.
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same is true for a qualifying parent and partially owned subsidiary.
When a parent and subsidiary have a "unity of purpose" -exemplified
by their "economic stake" and "ability to control" -coordination is
likely to have a greater procompetitive rather than anticompetitive
justification. This consequence is due to the significant cost efficiencies
resulting from vertical coordination, which may include the ability of
the firms to
cut sales and distribution costs, facilitate the flow of information
between levels of the industry (for example, marketing possibili-
ties may be transmitted more effectively from the retail to the
manufacturing level, new product possibilities may be transmit-
ted in the other direction, better inventory control may be at-
tained, and better planning of production runs may be achieved),
create economies of scale in management, and so on.
These efficiencies result in cost savings to the corporations that,
in a competitive market, will be passed on to consumers. One might
point out that parents and subsidiaries that do not meet the require-
ments for immunity under this test may still coordinate in efficient
manners that will not result in liability.12 It is important to note, how-
ever, that a defendant failing to qualify for immunity under the pro-
posed approach (by failing either one or both of the elements) has not
necessarily lost its case. In all but a select few cases-generally naked
price fixing-courts will engage in a "rule of reason" analysis. '26 This
124 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 227 (Free Press 1993).
125 This criticism might be made by proponents of the traditional control approach, since it
is somewhat less stringent than this Comment's approach.
126 The alternative to "rule of reason" analysis is generally considered "per se" analysis.
"Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompeti-
tive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct."
National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468
US 85,103-04 (1984). At one time, per se analysis was widely used for many activities that were
considered patently anticompetitive, such as price fixing. But over time, courts began to realize
that many activities that seem anticompetitive at first glance actually appear procompetitive
when the entirety of the circumstances is revealed. See Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Recon-
struction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics 117-54 (Cam-
bridge 1988) (tracing the history of this jurisprudential shift in antitrust doctrine). Thus, many
traditionally per se cases are now dealt with using rule of reason analysis. This means that the
plaintiff generally must show other conditions, such as market power or reduced output, that on
balance outweigh the defendant's procompetitive justifications for the behavior. See Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v United States, 246 US 231, 238 (1918) (stating that under the rule
of reason a court must determine "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition"). Although per se violations may still exist, "there is often no bright line separating
per se from Rule of Reason analysis," since "considerable inquiry into market conditions" is of-
ten required before per se condemnation is justified. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 468
US at 104 n 26. See also Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five Decisions in Search of a
Theory, 1984 Sup Ct Rev 69, 143 (noting that the Court "is reducing [the per se rule's] scope at
every turn-through expansion of the characterization process, through contraction of the sorts
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means that the court will consider a variety of factors in determining
antitrust liability. As Justice Breyer has stated, "rule of reason" analy-
sis can be broken down into "four classical [ ] antitrust questions: (1)
What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticom-
petitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications?
(4) Do the parties have sufficient market power to make a differ-
ence?"'27 Thus, a defendant that cannot claim immunity because it does
not own a controlling portion of the voting stock may still introduce
its common stock interest (or vice versa) into the rule of reason analy-
sis where it will be relevant to answer these four questions (especially
numbers two and three). A parent that does not own a majority of the
common stock or a controlling portion of the voting stock has not
acted anticompetitively merely because it fails the test and still acts in
concert with its subsidiary. Rather, courts must make a determination
on the merits as to whether the activity was procompetitive or anti-
competitive. Where the 50 percent ownership and 50 percent voting
power thresholds are satisfied, we are confident that the parent and
subsidiary have a unity of purpose, making a full-blown analysis of the
merits under Section 1 unnecessary.
b) Other antitrust provisions. Although this Comment's pro-
posed approach significantly broadens the scope of Copperweld, it
does not make parents or subsidiaries judgment proof when they act
in concert with anticompetitive results. In Copperweld itself, the Court
pointed out that granting broader immunity from conspiracy did not
"cripple antitrust enforcement."'" "A corporation's initial acquisition
of control will always be subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman
Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act.... Thereafter, the enterprise is fully
subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.' 29 The Comment's approach does not sanction anticom-
petitive conduct by a parent and a subsidiary satisfying these require-
ments of the test. Rather, it recognizes that the parent and the subsidi-
ary are really one enterprise and must accordingly be judged under
Sherman Act Section 2, which applies if the corporate enterprise "mo-
nopolize[s], or attempt[s] to monopolize.""' The threshold for liability
under Section 2 is greater than that of Section 1, which applies if con-
certed activity "is an unreasonable restraint of trade.'.' But this higher
of conduct to which they apply, and through refinements of the alternative approach, the rule of
reason").
127 California DentalAssociation v FTC, 526 US 756,782 (1999) (Breyer dissenting).
128 467 US at 777.
129 Id (stating that Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat 731 (1914), codified at 15 USC § 18 (1994), and
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat 719 (1914), codified at 15 USC § 45 (1994), address
the incipient anticompetitive conduct that will not fall under the Sherman Act).
130 15 USC § 2.
131 15 USC § 1. See note 2.
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threshold is appropriate where the rule grants immunity, because the
lesser threshold would otherwise be a severe disincentive for
procompetitive coordination by the parent and the subsidiary. This
rule also does not preclude all Section 1 claims; it only limits liability
after the acquisition is complete (and then only if both ownership cri-
teria are met). Private parties may still invoke Section 1 for conspiracy
prior to or during acquisition.
Furthermore, the Sherman Act does not stand in a vacuum; there
are other enforcement mechanisms to prevent possible antitrust
harms by a parent and a subsidiary. For instance, the 1992 U.S. De-
partment of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines prevent
corporations from entering parent-subsidiary relationships when
common ownership would give them a dangerous level of control over
any given market. The government evaluates the proposed combina-
tion using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI").132 Generally
speaking, any combination that significantly increases the concentra-
tion of a moderately concentrated or highly concentrated market (as
determined by the post-merger HHI) will receive high scrutiny or be
presumed unlawful. Although the DOJ will not step in when the rela-
tionship is purely vertical (as many parent-subsidiary relationships
are), the Guidelines serve as a safety precaution when the parent al-
ready occupies the market of the subsidiary it is acquiring.
Although this Comment's proposed approach will immunize
agreements between a parent and a subsidiary more than the de
minimis approach, it will by no means immunize them from antitrust
scrutiny altogether. Instead, it will accurately preserve the distinction
between concerted and unilateral activity that is at the heart of Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, providing a higher threshold for the
latter.
3. Harmony with other law.
In addition to the other policy advantages already mentioned,
this Comment's test gives parents an incentive to structure their con-
duct so it is in harmony with other areas of the law, especially corpo-
rate law. State corporation laws uniformly place a duty of loyalty on
those in control, in order to protect minority interests. In the context
of a parent-subsidiary relationship, this duty might be implicated if a
parent with a controlling vote causes a subsidiary to undertake busi-
ness ventures that are profitable for the parent-subsidiary enterprise
132 "The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all
the participants." ABA Section of Antitrust Law, The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines with
Commentary § 1.5 (ABA 1993). Thus, a market with only four participants, each having an equal
share of the market, would have an HHI of 2,500 (252+ 252+ 252+ 252= 2,500).
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as a whole, but that put the subsidiary by itself in a less profitable posi-
tion than it would otherwise have been.'33 Generally, these corporate
decisions that are not in the minority shareholders' best interest will
be made by the subsidiary's officers (many if not all of whom will be
hired by the parent-appointed directors) or directors, but occasionally
they might also be made by the majority of shareholders, in this case
the parent, acting independently. Under standard state corporation
laws, the minority shareholders will likely have recourse for corporate
decisions that benefit the parent at the expense of the subsidiary be-
cause of the fiduciary duty owed them by the directors'-" and officers.'3"
These remedies would be available anytime it "appears that there was
a background of self-dealing, conflict of interest, or illegality.
''
In addition to the legal limitations on directors and officers-
which will catch most of the instances of harm to minority sharehold-
ers -courts have increasingly shown a "willingness to apply [fiduciary]
duties" to shareholders "to the extent [they] hold[] the power to con-
trol the corporation.'". Although this principle is most often applied in
the context of close corporations,'  it was also applied in at least one
well-known case of a public corporation.9 In that case, the court
133 For instance, imagine that parent P owns barely (just over 50 percent) a controlling
stock and voting interest in subsidiary S. P and S enter into a course of conduct that will benefit
P by $100, but costs $50. P and S cumulatively are made better off by the amount of $50. But P
actually does better than that. P receives $100 of the gain on its side, and bears only $25 of the
loss on S's side (since P owns barely over one half). The minority shareholders bear the other
$25 of loss with no offsetting gain. Thus, this transaction transfers wealth from the minority
shareholders to the majority shareholders; P walks away with a gain of $75.
134 Klein and Coffee write:
Although the directors are not agents of the shareholders in the legal sense, they are con-
sidered to be quasi-trustees who are subject to "fiduciary duties" owed to the corporation;
in essence, these duties amount to the same kind of duty of loyalty and duty of care that an
agent owes to his or her principal.
Klein and Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 126 (cited in note 96).
135 "Legally, the officers ... of the corporation are agents of the corporation." Id at 131. Be-
cause of this, officers, like directors, have both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty that are owed
to the shareholders. See id at 148-68 (discussing the obligations of officers and directors to the
corporation).
136 Id at 126.
137 Id at 168.
138 See, for example, Perlman v Feldmann, 219 F2d 173,176 (2d Cir 1955) (holding that the
same fiduciary duty applicable to a director of a corporation applies to the majority shareholder
in a closely held corporation because the majority shareholder chooses and therefore controls
the director); Meiselman v Meiselman, 309 NC 279, 307 SE2d 551, 564-67 (1983) (reviewing the
duty owed by a majority shareholder to a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation);
Wilkes v Springside Nursing Home, Inc, 370 Mass 842, 353 NE2d 657, 663 (1976) (noting that "a
controlling group in a close corporation" has a "fiduciary obligation to the minority [sharehold-
ers]").
139 See Jones v H.E Ahmanson & Co, 1 Cal 3d 90, 460 P2d 464, 471 (1969) ("Any use to
which [the majority shareholders] put the corporation or their power to control the corporation
must benefit all shareholders proportionately."). The use of litigation against majority sharehold-
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stated that "majority shareholders ... have a fiduciary responsibility to
the minority and to the corporation to use their ability to control the
corporation in a fair, just, and equitable manner."'°
The proposed approach harmonizes well with the corporate duty
of loyalty because it requires parents that have control of a subsidiary
also to align their economic interests with those of their subsidiary,
through the common stock requirement. When a controlling parent
owns the majority of common stock, it is in the parent's best interests
to control the subsidiary in a way that will maximize the subsidiary's
wealth. In addition to promoting the antitrust goals of competitiveness
and consumer welfare, this principle also promotes an adherence to
the corporate duty of loyalty owed to other shareholders. At the same
time, it gives the parent the economic incentive to pursue efficient and
procompetitive conduct, because the benefits will flow to the subsidi-
ary and the parent.
While the antitrust laws can encourage procompetitive behavior
when applied appropriately, they should not be used in a manner so as
to subsume other areas of the law. Plaintiffs often try to formulate and
plead non-antitrust claims in antitrust terms so that they will reap the
treble damage awards and attorneys' fees recoverable under antitrust
law.' Copperweld is itself a good illustration of this general pattern in
antitrust litigation.1 42 Copperweld Corporation, the parent, and Regal
Tube Company, the subsidiary, were alleged to have interfered with a
contract between the plaintiff and a third party.' 3 The district court
held that they did wrongfully interfere, and placed the contractual
damages at nearly $2.5 million.'" The court then trebled this as an anti-
trust violation for a grand total of almost $7.5 million. '45 The Supreme
Court held that no antitrust violation occurred because the two enti-
ties had a "unity of purpose.'.. But that decision did not negate the
$2.5 million of contractual damages that were owed to the plaintiff.'7
ers in public corporations, however, is relatively rare. This probably reflects the fact that in most
cases the directors and officers are directly to blame, making them easier targets for litigation.
The point here is that majority shareholders have a fiduciary duty and could be held liable if the
need existed.
140 Id.
141 See Clayton Act, 15 USC § 15(a) (1994) (stating a person injured by a violation of anti-
trust laws can commence a civil suit for treble damages as well as costs of suit and reasonable at-
torneys' fees).
142 Judge Wood gives an excellent narrative of the facts and background of Copperweld. See
Wood Hutchinson, 1984 Sup Ct Rev at 88-95 (cited in note 126) (discussing how Copperweld led
to the downfall of intra-enterprise conspiracies under the Sherman Act).
143 Id at 89.
144 Id at 90.
145 Id.
146 See Part I.B.
147 Since the Supreme Court only reviewed the question of whether the parent and its sub-
sidiary could conspire, it presumably did not disturb the jury decision regarding contractual
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As in Copperweld, the proposed approach preserves a plaintiff's con-
tract, tort, or other legal claim when the parent and subsidiary pursue
legally actionable conduct, yet it realizes that the real harm done was
actionable as contractual misfeasance or tort, and not because the
parent and subsidiary coordinated unlawfully.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the Copperweld decision, courts have been struggling
with how to apply that case's rationale to parent corporations and
their partially owned subsidiaries. Some courts have been very cau-
tious in extending immunity and have only done so to a select few that
fall in the sometimes vague world of the de minimis difference. Afraid
to step out of the paradigmatic intra-enterprise conspiracy box, this
approach stops short of effectuating the underlying themes of Cop-
perweld. Other courts have more enthusiastically adopted the theme
embodied in "unity of purpose," and have rested their decisions on the
concept of control. Although this approach is certainly closer to the
mark than the de minimis approach, the better solution lies some-
where between the two.
To properly determine whether two corporations have a unity of
purpose, both the economic and voting control implications of the re-
lationship must be taken into account. Considering only one or the
other, as has typified the past, oversimplifies the relationship between
the two corporations. A corporation can have majority ownership of a
subsidiary and still not have a unity of purpose. Likewise it can have a
majority voting interest but not have a unity of purpose. But if a cor-
poration has both a majority of the equity and a majority of the voting
interest, then the possibility for anticompetitive harm is greatly re-
duced. The harm that is left is adequately (and more appropriately)
policed under other antitrust provisions that do not rely on concerted
activity and state law remedies for breach of fiduciary duty.
In addition to the analytic integrity of this approach to Copper-
weld, there will be many ancillary benefits. A bright-line rule will re-
duce uncertainty and conserve valuable judicial resources. Most im-
portantly, the rule represents a move towards delineating the bounda-
ries of antitrust law. No longer will claims that are, in substance, con-
tract or tort claims be allowed to masquerade as antitrust claims by
virtue of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
damages. See Copperweld, 467 US at 755 (setting forth the issue for which the Court granted cer-
tiorari).
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